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Abstract 
Many commodities are traded on both a spot market and a derivative market. We 
show that an incumbent producer may use financial derivatives to extract rent from a 
potential  entrant.  The  incumbent  can  indeed  sell  insurance  to  a  large  buyer  to 
commit himself to compete aggressively in the spot market and drive the price down 
for  the  entrant.  It  can  do  so  by  selling  derivatives  for  more  than  his  expected 
production  level,  i.e.  by  taking  a  speculative  position.  This  comes  at  the  cost  of 
inefficiently deterring entry. 
JEL codes: D43, D86, K21, L12, L42 
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1  Introduction 
Many commodities are traded on both a spot market and a derivatives market. On 
this latter market, financial instruments are used to take positions on the spot market 
price. The use of such instruments has exploded. In June 2008, before the financial 
collapse, the notional value of outstanding over-the-counter commodity derivatives 
worldwide was estimated at 13,229 billions of US dollars (BIS, 2010; p. A121), about 
28 times the 1998 value.4 A large fraction of those instruments were held by financial 
firms. Nonetheless, back in the 90s, surveys already indicated that about 50% of US 
non-financial  firms  used  derivatives  and  that 56%  of  those  perceived  commodity 
prices  as  a  relevant  source  of  risk  (Bodnar,  Hayt  and  Marston,  1998).  In  specific 
industries,  usage  of  commodity  derivatives  appears  to  be  widespread.  Examples 
include  the  gold  mining  industry  (Tufano,  1996,  1998)  or  the  energy  sector 
(Haushalter, 2000). 5  
In this paper, we explore the possibility for incumbent firms with market power in 
the product market to use financial instruments so as profitably to deter the entry of 
a more efficient rival. We show that an incumbent producer and a large buyer may 
have a joint interest in trading derivatives to extract rent from a potential entrant. 
This comes at the cost of inefficiently deterring entry. 
The intuition is as follows. In the seminal paper by Aghion and Bolton (1987), an 
incumbent convinces a large buyer to sign a sales contract that forces an entrant to 
charge a low price upon entry. Indeed, because of contractual penalties, breaching 
the contract is costly to the buyer. Hence, in order to remain competitive, the entrant 
must  compensate  the  buyer  for  the  penalty  by  posting  a  lower  price.  This  price 
                                                       
4 Notional values are not available for exchange-traded derivatives but in June 2010 about 
37.6 millions commodity futures and 20.6 millions options were outstanding (BIS, 2010; p. 
A127). 
5 For additional empirical evidence on the use of commodity derivatives by firms, see, inter 
alia, Nance et al. (1993), Mian (1996), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Hentschel and Kothari 
(2001), Graham and Rogers (2002), Guay and Kothari (2003), Adam and Fernando (2006).   3 
reduction  discourages  entry  but,  through  the  transfers  specified  in  the  contract, 
accrues to the incumbent in cases where entry does occur. 
Our  model  extends  the  logic  of  Aghion  and  Bolton  (1987)  to  the  case  where  the 
incumbent  offers  the  buyer  a  purely  financial  contract  (call  option  or  forward 
contract) instead of an exclusivity contract.6 The incumbent can use this contract to 
“commit” himself to compete aggressively in the spot market and drive the price 
down  for  the  entrant.  It  can  do  so  by  selling  more  financial  contracts  than  his 
expected  production  level,  i.e.  by  taking  a  speculative  position.  Importantly,  the 
exclusionary scheme can be operated even when the identity of parties to a deal in 
financial markets is not observable. 
Currently, competition authorities do not routinely monitor the financial positions 
taken by dominant firms. We argue that on certain markets, this may be needed to 
counter the incentives for incumbents to commit to (overly) aggressive pricing. 
This  paper  relates  to  several  strands  of  economic  literature.  First,  there  is  now  a 
voluminous literature on corporate risk management.7 It is typically interested in 
explaining the hedging behavior of firms, in spite of the possibility for claimholders 
(such  as  shareholders)  to  diversify  their  portfolio.  Leading  explanations  resort  to 
conflicting objectives between managers and shareholders (Stulz, 1984, 1991), agency 
problems between firms and investors leading to credit rationing, thus providing 
firms with an incentive to smooth out their cash flow (Campbell and Kracaw, 1990; 
                                                       
6 As noted by Rey and Tirole (2007; footnote 91), the contract in Aghion and Bolton (1987) can 
be given a physical option interpretation: the buyer pays a fixed fee in order to acquire the 
right  to  acquire  the  good  at  a  pre-specified  price.  Thus,  physical  options  can  be  used  to 
exclude. We here focus on purely financial instruments: contracts that are settled in cash and 
do not involve the physical delivery of the product, as is the norm on derivatives markets. As 
will  become  clear  later  in  the  paper,  the  exclusion  scheme  becomes  more  costly  for  the 
incumbent  with  financial  rather  than  physical  options  under  risk  aversion.  Although  the 
mechanism is different, this outcome resonates with results regarding electricity distribution 
congestion  pricing  showing  that  financial  transmission  rights  are  less  harmful  to  social 
welfare than physical transmission rights in the presence of market power; see Joskow and 
Tirole (2000). 
7 It is impossible to do justice to all contributors. For a state-of-the-art survey of corporate 
finance theory, see Tirole (2006).   4 
Froot,  Scharfstein  and  Stein,  1993),  or  tax  distortions  (Smith  and  Schultz,  1985; 
MacMinn, 1987). At the same time, it is known that some factors lead firms not to 
hedge  their  income  flow.  Market  power  is  one  of  them.  Forward  sales  reduce 
monopoly power and, in the absence of reinvestment needs, a monopolist would 
find  it  optimal  never  to  hedge  income.8  We  push  the  logic  one  step  further  by 
showing that a monopolist can actually favor taking a risky position for the sake of 
deterring entry. 
Second, a growing literature looks at the interaction between derivatives markets and 
product markets in oligopoly settings. The main message in this literature is that 
firms may use financial derivatives strategically to affect the equilibrium in the spot 
market and increase their overall profit. The precise strategy depends on the nature 
of  competition.  If  oligopolists  compete  à  la  Cournot,  then  they  will  sell  forward 
contracts (or integrate vertically) to compete more aggressively in the market, in an 
attempt  at  increasing  their  market  share  at  the  expense  of  the  other  participants 
(Allaz and Vila, 1993).9 Willems (2005) shows that those results also hold for option 
contracts. On the other hand, if oligopolists compete à la Bertrand, then they have an 
incentive to buy forward contracts, and commit to being less aggressive (Mahenc and 
Salanié, 2004).10 We show that even under price competition, financial instruments 
can  be  used  by  an  incumbent  to  increase  the  intensity  of  competition  but  with 
deleterious effects on entry incentives. 
Third, predation constitutes a prominent link between financial markets and product 
markets.  Bolton  and  Scharfstein  (1990)  were  the  first  to  provide  theoretical 
underpinnings to the "long purse" predation theory, according to which cash-rich 
firms can drive out rivals with limited access to internal funds in the presence of 
                                                       
8 See Tirole (2006; section 5.4) 
9 Hughes and Kao (1997) extend the analysis to the case where forward contracts are not 
observable and show that they can still be used for strategic purposes. 
10 See Adam, Dasgupta and Titman (2007) for a model in which only a subset of symmetric 
firms choose to hedge. Starting with Brander and Lewis (1986) (for Cournot competition) and 
Showalter (1995) (for Bertrand competition) a parallel literature developed on the interaction 
between corporate financing choices and product market competition.   5 
agency  problems.11  Scott  Morton  (1997)  indeed  finds  that  "financially  weaker" 
entrants  tended  to  be  fought  more  often  by  nineteenth-century  shipping  cartels. 
Chevalier  (1995)  and  Campello  (2003,  2006)  report  some  evidence  that  rivals  of 
highly-leveraged firms increase investments so as to gain more market share and 
drive the financially-constrained firms out of business. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 
(1993)  argue  that  the  use  of  corporate  derivatives  can  protect  firms  from  this 
predatory risk. Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2007) indeed present some evidence 
that the extent of the interdependence of firm's investment opportunities with rivals 
is positively associated with its use of derivatives. Most modern theories of predation 
involve  asymmetric  information  and  some  manipulation  of  (the  entrant's  or  its 
creditors')  beliefs.12  Our  model  shows  that  below-cost  pricing  can  also  arise  in  a 
perfect information model when an incumbent has an interest in taking a financial 
bet on low prices. It also suggests that the availability of derivatives, although useful 
to the prey, can also be useful to the predator. 
Fourth, our paper relates more generally to the large literature on exclusion.13 We 
show  that  the  range  of  exclusionary  contractual  practices  is  not  limited  to 
instruments with obvious entry restrictions, such as exclusivity contracts, but that 
apparently innocuous contracts such as standard derivatives can also be misused. 
Some  authors  have  explored  the  role  of  corporate  financing  choices  in  product 
market exclusionary strategies. McAndrews and Nakamura (1992) investigate entry 
deterrence  possibilities  in  a  quantity  competition  model  and  show  that  when 
demand is uncertain, an incumbent can use debt to discourage a Cournot entrant 
without deviating from the all-equity monopoly output. Showalter (1999) shows that 
in  an  industry  with  uncertain  costs  and  Bertrand  competition,  an  incumbent 
monopolist can occasionally deter entry by using debt to commit to a sufficiently low 
                                                       
11 See also Benoît (1983) (exogenous financial constraints) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) 
(“long-purse” interpretation of their “signal-jamming” predation model). 
12 As examplified by the presentations in Bolton, Brodley and Riordan (2000) or Motta (2004). 
13 The literature on entry deterrence is enormous. See Ordover and Saloner (1989) and Wilson 
(1992) for surveys of early pieces. Exclusion by means of (exclusivity) contracts was most 
recently surveyed by Whinston (2006) and Rey and Tirole (2007).   6 
price.  Cestone  and  White  (2003)  show  that,  if  credit  markets  are  imperfectly 
competitive, commitment problems on the part of the investor lead to the choice of 
equity as the way to fund an incumbent so as to prevent rivals from accessing credit. 
In this paper, we look at derivatives markets, rather than debt or equity markets. 
Fifth, there is small literature about price-increasing entry, a feature of our model. 
Rosenthal (1980), Hollander (1987) and Perloff, Suslow and Seguin (2006) show that 
on a market for differentiated products, composition effects on the demand-side may 
cause prices to increase when an additional variant is introduced. Chen and Riordan 
(2008) use a discrete choice model of product differentiation to analyze how more 
consumer  choice  can  change  the  price  elasticity  of  demand.  Satterthwaite  (1979), 
Schulz and Stahl (1996) and Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) stress the role of 
endogenous  search  costs.  We  show  that  on  a  market  for  a  homogenous  good,  the 
exclusionary strategy of an incumbent can give rise to the phenomenon. 
The paper is structured as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, 
we conduct the main analysis. Section 4 extends the model by assuming that the 
identity of the parties to the financial contract is not observable. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Model 
We study the subgame-perfect equilibria of a game between three players: the buyer, 
the incumbent and the entrant. With the exception of risk preferences, the model 
follows Aghion and Bolton (1987). 
The buyer has unit demand for the good. His reservation price is equal to 1. He is 
risk-averse  and  his  preferences  are  represented  by  a  von  Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function U . His expected utility when consuming 1 unit of the good is equal 
to  
  [ (1 )] B E U p -   (1) 
where expectations are taken over the different states of the world, and  B p  is the 
price  faced  by  the  buyer  in  a  specific  state.  The  utility  function  of  the  buyer  is   7 
upward-sloping and concave ( ' 0 U >  and  '' 0 U £ ), and so normalized that  (0) 0 U =
.14 
The incumbent producer is risk-neutral and has a production cost  1 I c < . He seeks to 
maximize expected profit. 
The entrant producer is also risk-neutral and has a production cost  E c  which, for 
simplicity,  is  drawn  from  the  uniform  distribution  over  [0,1].  The  cumulative 
distribution function of her production costs is thus  ( ) E E F c c = . Uncertainty about 
E c  is the only source of uncertainty in our model.15 The entrant strives to maximize 
expected profit. 
The game consists of four stages. In stage 1 the incumbent makes a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to sell to the buyer  x  call options with strike price  s  and fee  f . According to 
this contract  ( ) , , x f s , the buyer pays  x times the fixed fee  f  upfront in order to 
acquire the right to be paid x times the difference between the spot market price  p  
and the strike price  s  (which he will exercise as long as this difference is positive). 
Hence, the buyer’s financial gains from the contract are given by 
  ( max{ ,0}) x f p s × - + -   (2) 
In stage 2 of the game, the buyer decides whether he accepts the contract offered by 
the incumbent or not. 
In stage 3 the entrant and all other players in the game observe the financial position 
of the incumbent and the buyer and learn about  E c .16 The entrant decides whether 
she enters the market. 
                                                       
14 Risk aversion provides a justification for the very existence of a derivatives market. Our 
exclusion result can, however, also be derived with a risk-neutral buyer. 
15 We solve for pure-strategy equilibria. Hence, there is no additional, ‘strategic’ source of risk 
in the model.  
16 Accounting rules often provide for some form of disclosure of the financial positions taken 
by  public  firms.  See,  for  instance,  International  Financial  Reporting  Standard  (IFRS)  7, 
Financial  Instruments:  Disclosures,  issued  by  the  International  Accounting  Standards  Board 
(IASB).    8 
In stage 4, Bertrand competition takes place in the spot market. Firms who are active 
in the market post bids ( I p  and  E p  for the incumbent and the entrant, respectively) 
and  the buyer  decides with whom  (if  any)  to transact.  The  payoff  of the entrant 
directly depends on the spot market price and sales. The utilities of the buyer and the 
incumbent  producer  depend  not  only  on  the  spot  market  sales  but  also  on  the 
financial contract that they may have previously signed.17 
3   Analysis 
3.1  Taking a financial position so as to hedge 
Before looking for the equilibrium of this game, we will first study the benchmark 
case  where  players  use  financial  contracts  for  the  sole  purpose  of  hedging  their 
activities.  
We  therefore  restrict  the  incumbent  to  offer  a  forward  contract  for  one  unit  of 
production, that is, a contract with  1 x =  and  0 s = . This contract perfectly insures the 
buyer against any price change in the spot market and, as demand is inelastic, leads 
to perfect hedging. In effect, the forward contract specifies that the buyer can transact 
at price  f . 
Suppose that this contract has been accepted by the buyer and that the entrant has 
decided to enter the market. In stage 4, the buyer is indifferent between buying from 
the incumbent or the entrant, given that he is perfectly insured.  
If he makes the sale, the incumbent is perfectly hedged against the variations in the 
spot market price. However, he is willing to cut his price if that is needed to prevent 
the entrant from making the sale and leaving him with financial liabilities only. He 
                                                       
17 We assume that derivatives contracts have to be executed. Renegotiation-proofness is an 
issue  in  models  of  inefficient  exclusion  by  means  of  contracts,  as  shown  by  Spier  and 
Whinston (1995) in the case of the original Aghion and Bolton (1987) model. The general issue 
is  the  one  of  the  commitment  value  of  contracts  towards  third  parties.  Asymmetric 
information  may  restore  commitment  power;  see,  e.g.,  Dewatripont  (1987),  Katz  (1991)  or 
Caillaud,  Jullien  and  Picard  (1995).  We  note  that  financial  contracts  typically  involve 
intermediaries and that agents have to execute the promised trade in order to remain in good 
standing with the exchange or the broker.   9 
will do so as long as  E I p c > . Note that the incumbent never wants to sell below his 
own cost. The entrant always wants to undercut any price  I E p c >  posted by the 
incumbent, as in standard Bertrand competition. So, in equilibrium, both sellers post 
the same price  { } max , I E I E p p c c = =  and the buyer buys from the firm with the 
lowest marginal cost.18 
By  backward  induction,  the  entrant  will  enter  only  if  her  marginal  cost  is  small 
enough to allow her to make profitable sales:  
  ( ) 0. E I E c c p = - >  
That  is,  the  entrant  enters  only  when  she  is  the  most  efficient  firm.  Given  our 
assumption that  E c  is uniformly distributed, the probability of entry under hedging 
(subscript H) is: 
  . H I c φ =   (3) 
In case the entrant stays out, then the incumbent (and the buyer) will subsequently 
be indifferent between all prices. For determinacy (and without any impact on the 
results, which depend only on the entry pattern), we assume that the incumbent will 
post a price  I p  equal to the monopoly price, 1 (as would be the case if any additional 
buyer, however marginal, were present on the demand side). 






( ) 1 (1 )












  − ≥ −  
  (4) 
The objective function reflects the fact that the incumbent is perfectly hedged: in any 
case, he collects the fixed fee  f  for selling the forward contract. Upon entry, which 
occurs with probability  H f , the entrant makes the sale and the incumbent has to pay 
                                                       
18 Otherwise, the low-cost firm would undercut and we would not have an equilibrium.   10
the  market  price  ( I c )  to  the  buyer.  When  the  entrant  chooses  to  stay  out,  the 
incumbent makes the sale and earns the spot market price  1 p =  but because of the 
forward contract he pays it back to the entrant, while he incurs production cost  I c .  
Constraint  (i)  reflects  the  anticipation  of  entry.  Inequality  (ii)  stands  for  the 
participation constraint of the buyer: in order to accept the contract, he must be left 
with at least as much utility as when he refuses it (in which case he makes a surplus 
only when entry occurs and the price drops from 1 to  I c ). 
Observe that with the forward contract there is nothing that the incumbent can do to 
affect entry. The program thus boils down to providing insurance to the buyer and 
extracting as big a fraction of risk-sharing gains as possible from the buyer through 
forward price  f . Having all bargaining power, the incumbent will thus hold the 
buyer to his reservation utility level by setting forward price  H f  so as to make (ii) 
bind, i.e.  (1 ) (1 )
H H I U f c φ − = − .  
Note  that  entry  will  be  efficient.  The  entrant  will  enter  whenever  her  cost  of 
production  is  smaller  than  the  incumbent’s.  Thus,  the  presence  of  the  financial 
contract is efficient as production is performed by the lowest-cost firm and the risk-
averse buyer is fully insured. 
3.2  Taking a financial position so as to exclude 
Assume now that the incumbent can offer  x call options with strike price  s  and fee 
f to the buyer. The buyer will exercise his options whenever  p s ³ . If the strike price 
is high  ( ) I s c ³ , then the option will, in equilibrium, have no effect on the product 
market outcome.19 It follows that the incumbent cannot improve his payoff by selling 
                                                       
19 The reaction function of the incumbent will be affected by the sales of the options, for price 
bids of the entrant which lie above the strike price of the option. In particular, the incumbent 
will price more aggressively. This reduces the equilibrium profit of the entrant, if the entrant's 
cost is above the strike price. However, the entrant will only enter if its costs are at least lower 
than the one of the incumbent. Hence, options with a high strike price will only affect those 
subgames which are not reached in equilibrium.    11
such  options.  Therefore,  in  what  follows  we  will  assume  that  the  strike  price  is 
smaller than the cost of the incumbent:  I s c < . 
In Stage 4, following entry, the profit of the incumbent is the following  
  { } max 0, ( ) I I I I x f x p s p c q Π = − − + −   (5) 
where  p  is the spot price,  I p  denotes the price posted by the incumbent, and  I q  the 
sales made by him. Those sales equal 1 when the buyer buys from the incumbent and 
0 when he buys from the entrant. The incumbent sells the options at fee  f  (first 
term), insures the buyer when the spot price is high (second term), and makes an 
operational profit on his activity as producer (third term). 
The profit of the entrant is given by 
  ( ) E E E E p c q Π = −   (6) 
where  {0,1} E q Î  stands for her sales in the spot market.  
The buyer maximizes his utility by choosing whether he accepts the incumbent’s 
offer or the entrant’s:  
  { } ( )
{ , }
max 1 max 0,
B I E
B p p p
U p x p s
∈
− + −   (7) 
where,  by  definition,  B p   stands  for  the  price  at  which  the  buyer  transacts,  and 
min{ , } I E p p p =  is the spot market price. We assume that the buyer cannot affect the 
spot market price  p  by switching to a more expensive supplier and pay a price 
B p p > .  (Again,  this would  be  the  case  in  the  presence  of  any  additional  buyer, 
however marginal.) As a consequence, the buyer will always buy from the firm that 
offers the lowest price. 20 
                                                       
20 That is to say, in our model financial contracts are defined with reference to the (publicly 
observable) spot market price, and not the price at which the contracted buyer transacts. This 
is  a  plausible  assumption.  The  contracting  parties  would  be  wary  of  moral  hazard  when 
indexing a transfer on a price which could be manipulated by one of them. Besides, options 
are typically defined with respect to the spot price, as quoted on an exchange, and not the 
price observed in individual over-the-counter transactions.   12
3.2.1  Pricing subgame 
We now study the pricing behavior of the incumbent and the entrant. The behavior 
of the entrant is straightforward. As in a standard Bertrand game, she will undercut 
any price posted by the incumbent as long as this price is above her production cost 
E c .  
The  behavior  of  the  incumbent  depends  on  his  financial  commitments.  He  will 
undercut  as  long  as  the  financial  gains  from  decreasing  the  price  outweigh  the 
operational losses from selling below cost. By not undercutting, the incumbent does 
not make the sale ( 0 I q = ), and receives from (5) a profit equal to 
  { } max ,0 . E x f x p s − −   (8) 
Upon undercutting ( 1 I q = ), he makes  
  { } max ,0 ( ) I I I x f x p s p c − − + −   (9) 
If the entrant bids below the strike price ( E p s < ), then the option is not exercised 
and the incumbent will not undercut the entrant as it would only obtain a negative 
operational profit (since we assumed that  I s c < ). If the entrant bids above the strike 
price ( E p s ³ ) and the contract is such that  1 x > , then, upon undercutting, the 
incumbent will drop its price to the strike price  I p s =  to get rid of his financial 
liability.21 In this case his profit is: 
  I x f s c + −   (10) 
Comparing (8) and (10), dropping the bid to the level of the strike price is profitable 
as long as  *
E p p > , where 
* c s I
x p s
- º + . Note that 
*
I s p c £ £ , and that the incumbent 
will  undercut  the  entrant  even  when  the  price  of  the  entrant  is  below  his  own 
marginal cost.  
                                                       
21 If  1 x £ , the operational profit is always bigger than financial losses, so that the subgame 
reduces to standard Bertrand competition.   13
We proceed with deriving the equilibrium price,  p , as a function of the cost of the 
entrant,  E c . Several cases must be distinguished. 
(1) If 
*
E c p ³ , then any profitable bid by the entrant is matched by a bid  I p s =  
by the incumbent. Thus, the equilibrium prescribes that  I p s = , 
*
E p p ³  and 
the buyer buys from the incumbent ( 1, 0 I E q q = = ). That is, as the entrant's 
cost is relatively high, she cannot post a price that overcomes the incentive for 
the incumbent to price so low as to avoid financial losses. We call this a type 
A equilibrium.  
(2) If 
*
E s c p £ < ,  there  are  several  equilibria.  The  type  A  equilibrium  still 
constitutes a Nash equilibrium (
*, , E I p p p s ³ = ). Yet, there is another class 
of  equilibria  in  which  the  incumbent  and  the  entrant  bid  the  same  price, 
*
E E I c p p p £ = £  and the buyer buys from the entrant. As in the standard 
Bertrand game, we only take an interest in the highest price equilibrium in 
this class of equilibria. 22 Hence, in this type B equilibrium 
*
E I p p p = = . This 
multiplicity  raises  an  equilibrium  selection  problem.  In  the  type  A 
equilibrium with market price s , the profits of the incumbent and the entrant 
are as follows: 
  , 0 I I E s c xf Π = − + Π =   (11) 
In the type B equilibrium with market price 
* p , the profits of the incumbent 
and the entrant are:  
  * *
I E E s p xf p c Π = − + Π = −   (12) 
                                                       
22  In  a  standard  Bertrand  game  with  asymmetric  yet  constant  marginal  costs,  a  similar 
multiplicity problem arises. The price can  be lower than the second lowest marginal cost 
because the high-cost firm, although he doesn't make any sale, constrains the price of the 
lowest cost firm by bidding low. Such equilibria do not survive standard refinements such as 
trembling-hand perfection or elimination of weakly dominated strategies.   14
Thus, the type B equilibrium brings strictly more profit to both firms given 
that  * I p c < . We therefore assume that it is the one played by firms.23 
(3) If  E c s < , only type B equilibria exist.  
To  summarize,  if  the  marginal  cost  of  the  entrant  is  high  (
*
E c p > ),  then  the 
equilibrium price is equal to the strike price, (
* , I E p p s p p = = ³ ), and the sale is 
made by the incumbent. If the marginal cost of the entrant is low (
*
E c p £ ), then the 
equilibrium  is  given  by 
*
E I p p p p = = = ,  and  the  sale  is  made  by  the  entrant.  
Interestingly, the spot price is higher when the entrant has a low cost. This is of 
course due to the incentives introduced by the presence of financial bets. If there is 
no entry in the market, then the incumbent, who is making the sale for sure, wants to 
minimize his financial losses by charging the strike price  I p s = . 
3.2.2  Entry decision 
Anticipating this pattern, the entrant will thus enter only if  *
E c p ≤ . The probability 
of entry under speculation (subscript S) is then equal to 
*
S p f = . So, in the absence of 
entry, the spot price is  s, while it is  * p s >  following entry. Therefore, the presence of 
a large volume of option contracts between the incumbent and the buyer gives rise to 
the phenomenon of price-increasing entry. See Figure 1. 
3.2.3  Program of the incumbent 
In stage 1, the incumbent maximizes his profit by offering  x  option contracts with 
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    − + − − + − − − ≥ −        
                                                       
23  There  is  some  experimental  evidence  that  in  coordination  games  with  Pareto-ranked 
equilibria, players manage to achieve coordination in a number of environments. See Devetag 
and Ortmann (2007).   15
 
Figure 1: Market price as a function of entrant’s cost for  1 x =  (dashed) and  1 x >  
(continuous)  














    − + − + − − ≥ −    




− = +  is the probability of entry, and F xf s ≡ + , the generalized price of 
the  contract.  Along  with  the  constraint,  which  will  bind  as  F   is  a  transfer,  the 
optimal contract is characterized by the following condition: 
  1 1 ' 1 I I U F c U F U F c φ φ φ       − + − − − = − + −         (14) 
The left-hand side of equation (14) is the marginal benefit of allowing additional 
entry (the good is obtained from the entrant at cost f  instead of being produced by 
the incumbent at cost  I c ), while the right-hand side is the marginal effect on the 
buyer’s  expected  utility  of  the  increase  in  the  post-entry  price  that  comes  with 
additional entry. Together with the participation constraint of the buyer, equation 
(14) then determines the optimal entry rate and the optimal fee structure. Observe 
that there are infinitely many choices of  f ,  s  and  x  that allow the incumbent to 
implement the optimal rate of exclusion so as to maximize his rents.  
It is easily seen that in case of risk neutrality ( ) ( ) U x x =  expression (14) simplifies to 
2 I c f = . If the buyer is risk averse ( " 0 U < ), then the optimal level of entry will be 










of the utility function. The average increase in utility from receiving extra income 
I c f -  is larger than the marginal utility evaluated at the end income level24: 
 












  − + − − −     > − + −   −
  (15) 
Combining this expression with (14) gives  2 I c f > . That is, risk aversion obliges the 
incumbent to allow for more entry than joint-surplus maximization would dictate. 
The intuition for this result is clear. At  2 I c f = , any change in f  has second-order 
effects on the surplus extracted from the entrant. At the same time, allowing for entry 
improves the terms of the lottery faced by the buyer, which is a first-order effect 
under risk aversion.25  
Interestingly, among the infinitely many combinations of s ,  x, and  f  that allow the 
incumbent to achieve optimal exclusion (from his point of view), there is an optimal 
contract with  0 s = , i.e. a forward contract. Hence, exclusion does not require the use 
of (somewhat) complicated option contracts. Simple forward contracts can be used. 
3.3  Equilibrium 
We are now in the position to assert our main result: for any level of risk aversion, 
the incumbent will offer (and the buyer will accept) a speculative contract that leads 
to an inefficiently low level of entry. 
To this purpose, it is sufficient to compare the profit of the incumbent under the 
optimal  hedging  (section  3.1)  and  optimal  speculative  (section  3.2)  contracts, 
respectively. Observe that when faced with program (13) (when restricted to  1 x > ), 
the incumbent can reproduce the solution to program (4) (when restricted to  1 x £ ) 
by choosing  I s c = , in which case the objective function takes the same value in both 
                                                       
24 For a strictly concave utility function, it must hold that  ( ) ( ) '( ) U x y U x U x y y + - > + , for 
any  x  and  y . 
25 If physical options were available, the incumbent would not have to expose the buyer to 
risk. Selling at fee  f one option for buying the good at price f  obliges the entrant to price at 
f  while perfectly hedging the buyer. Thus, the incumbent would not have to compensate the 
buyer for the extra risk and the exclusion scheme would more profitable to the incumbent.   17
programs.  Hence,  the  incumbent  can  always  do  at  least  as  much  as  by  perfectly 
hedging the buyer. As matter of fact, it is easy to show that it can do strictly better. 
From  equation  (14),  when  I c f = ,  the  net  marginal  benefit  of  increasing  entry  is 
strictly negative, indicating that the incumbent can strictly win by choosing  I c f < . 
Proposition 1. In subgame-perfect equilibrium, the incumbent offers, and the buyer accepts, 
a contract ( ) , , x f s  characterized by 
 
* * * * * *
* * * * *
1 1 ' 1
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
I I
I I I
U F c U F U F c
U F c U F c U c
f f f
f f f
       - + - - - = - + -       

    - + - + - - = -      
  (16) 
where  * I c s
x s φ
− = +  and  * F xf s = + . There are infinitely many such contracts but they 
are all such that  1 x > ,  I s c <  and 
*
H f f < . 
4  Extension 
Until now we have assumed that the buyer and the entrant knew that the contract 
was offered by the incumbent, who would price more aggressively upon entry. The 
buyer was willing to pay a premium for the contract, as he expected lower prices in 
the future. We now relax the assumption that the buyer and the entrant observe the 
identity  of  the  contract’s  offerer  and  instead  suppose  that  they  only  observe  the 
contract  characteristics.  This  may  be  more  realistic.  Bilateral,  over-the-counter 
contracts are typically struck through a bank or a broker and trades in a centralized 
market remain  anonymous.  The question  then arises  as  to  whether  the exclusion 
mechanism  we  identified  above  can  survive  non-observability  of  the  contracting 
parties’  identities.  In  particular,  if  the  counterparties  to  the  contract  were  not 
observed, would it be profitable for other agents (say, arbitrageurs) to mimic the 
contract that the incumbent is supposed to offer? Given that the buyer is willing to 
pay  a  premium  for  the  contract  when  the  counterparty  is  the  incumbent,  such 
mimicking behavior could be very profitable. 
We model this environment as a signaling game where different option sellers (the 
incumbent  and  some  arbitrageurs)  submit  bids  into  the  derivatives  market.  The 
specifications of the bids are observed by the entrant and the buyer, but the identity   18
of the bidders is not. The entrant and the buyer must thus form beliefs about the type 
of bidders based on the bids they submit.  
We show a separating equilibrium can arise, in which market participants believe 
that  only  the  incumbent  can  profitably  offer  exclusionary,  speculative  contracts. 
(There  are  other  equilibria.  As  is  well-known,  asymmetric  information  games 
typically admit many equilibria.) 
Our basic model is thus modified as follows. We add n risk-neutral arbitrageurs who 
in stage 1, along with the incumbent, simultaneously post the terms  ( , , ) x f s  of the 
option contract they are willing to sell. The buyer will be randomly presented with 
one of the  1 n+  contracts. The buyer can accept or reject the contract, and will not be 
presented with another contract.26 The identity of the contract offerer is not revealed. 
In  stage  2,  the  buyer  decides  whether  he  accepts  the  contract  on  offer.  The 
contracting  position  of  the  buyer  is  observed  by  the  entrant  and  the  game  then 
proceeds as in the original model. Again, other game protocols are possible. Our goal 
is not to model the microstructure of financial markets but to highlight the potential 
incentive problem arising from anonymity. 
We construct an equilibrium in which the incumbent offers one contract ( , , )
I I I x f s , 
the arbitrageurs another one ( , , )
A A A x f s , the buyer accepts any offer put to him and 
correctly anticipates (as does the entrant) that only the incumbent is able profitably to 
offer the first contract. We will show that the incumbent can actually implement the 
same exclusion scheme as in the original model. 
On the equilibrium path, an arbitrageur offers a contract that identifies him as such. 
So, the buyer and the entrant believe that spot market prices will not be affected by 
acceptance,  and  entry  will  be  efficient.  An  arbitrageur  maximizes  his  payoff  by 
                                                       
26 The probability with which various contracts are presented to the buyer does not affect the 
structure of the equilibrium, as long as it is non-zero. By contrast, if the buyer were presented 
with,  and  could  accept,  more  than  one  contract,  then  his  outside  option  would  become 
endogenous and the participation constraint could become tighter as a result, increasing the 
cost of entry deterrence. In addition, the belief structure would have to depend on the entire 
set of contracts offered, which raises thorny conceptual difficulties.   19
insuring  the  buyer  against  the  price  risk  under  efficient  entry  and,  as  it  has  all 
bargaining power, he can extract all gains from risk-sharing. That is, he will offer a 
forward contract ( , , )
A A A x f s  such that  0 A s = ,  1 A x =  and  A H f f = .  
In a separating equilibrium, the incumbent’s actions are constrained by the presence 
of  other  sellers  of  financial  instruments.  The  incumbent  must  make  an  offer  that 
cannot be profitably mimicked by arbitrageurs. In order to prevent arbitrageurs from 
masquerading as an incumbent, it must be the case that the incumbent’s contract 
brings them less utility than their equilibrium contract. 
Suppose that an arbitrageur deviates from the candidate equilibrium by offering the 
same contract as the incumbent. If this contract happens to be presented to the buyer, 
then the latter will choose to accept it, under the (mistaken) belief that the offerer is 
the incumbent. The entrant, upon observing the financial position of the buyer, will 
hold the same (mistaken) belief. Hence, she will choose to enter only when  *
E c p < , 
and the probability of entry will be  S f . In stage 4, she will follow her equilibrium 
strategy  by  bidding 
* p .  This  deviation  is  not  profitable  to  the  arbitrageur  if  the 
financial gains from the contract are negative.27 That is, 
  ￿ ( ) ( )
*
*
without entry with entry
1
   




x f x p s x s f f
=
=
× - × × - - - × × - £
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
  (17) 
Using the same change of variables as before, the constraint can be rewritten as 
  2 ( ) (1 ) I F c x f - < -   (18) 
with F xf s ≡ +  and 
I c s
x s φ
− = + . 
On the equilibrium path, one can thus write the program of the incumbent in stage 1 
as follows: 
                                                       
27 As a matter of fact, it would be sufficient that the net gains from mimicking are lower than 
their net gains on the equilibrium contract (which are positive). We make the task of the 
incumbent harder by requiring the net gains to be negative.   20
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This  is  the  same  program  as  in  Section  3,  except  for  the  additional  separating 
constraint,  (ii),  which  prevents  arbitrageurs  from  mimicking  the  offer  of  the 
incumbent. It is not clear that this constraint is well-behaved. However, it will be 
shown that there exists a solution of the initial program in Proposition 1 (in fact, 
many)  which  does not violate  this  additional  constraint, and  is therefore  optimal 
under the constrained program. 
Proposition  2.  There  exists  a  perfect  Bayesian  separating  equilibrium  in  which  the 
incumbent offers a contract  ( ) , , I I I x f s  such that 
* F F =  and 
* f f = , and the arbitrageurs 
offer a contract  ( ) ( , , ) 1, ,0 A A A H x f s f = . 
Proof.  Given 
* F   and 
* φ ,  choose  a  sufficiently  large  number  of  option 
contracts  1 I x >  such that 
*





− > . For this quantity 













+ = . The entrant and the buyer observe the contract that has been 
offered. When the entrant and the buyer observe ( ) , , I I I x f s , they believe that 
the  contract  was  offered  with  probability  one  by  the  incumbent  and  the 
entrant enters whenever  * E c p £  and prices at  * p . They buyer accepts the 
contract  out  of  indifference.  When  they  observe  any  other  contract  they 
believe that the contract was offered with probability one by an arbitrageur 
and the entrant enters whenever  E I c c £  and prices at  I c . The buyer accepts 
the contract if it gives at least the certainty equivalent of the lottery under 
efficient entry,  (1 ) H I U c f - . 
 The  incumbent  has  no  incentive  to  deviate:  he  offers  the  buyer  the  best 
contract compatible with the latter’s equilibrium outside option. Mimicking 
arbitrageurs would lead to a decrease in his profit and any other contract 
cannot  be  simultaneously  accepted  by  the  buyer  and  profitable  to  him.   21
Arbitrageurs do not want to deviate either. They have no incentive to offer 
better insurance terms to the buyer, since that would only lower their profit. 
Offering worse insurance terms would not be accepted by the buyer. Suppose 
they  mimicked  the  incumbent  and  offered  the  contract  ( , , )
I I I x f s   as  well. 
Given the belief structure their contract would be accepted by the buyer, but 
they would then make a loss, as constraint (ii) is met.□ 
This result is intuitive if we compare the incumbent’s profit with the profit of the 
mimicking arbitrageurs. The profitability of selling the contract differs only when 
there is no entry, that is, in those cases where the incumbent makes the sale. If the 
contract of the mimicking arbitrageur has been accepted and the entrant stays out the 
market , then the incumbent will set a price  1 p =  as there is no competitive pressure 
from the entrant. The arbitrageurs then will have to refund the buyer for high spot 
prices ( (1 )
I I x s − ). If the incumbent sells the contract himself and the entrant stays 
out, then he will get rid of financial liabilities by setting a price equal to the strike 
price  p s =  and, by selling below cost, making a loss equal to ( )
I I c s − . Thus, by 
increasing the number contracts that is sold, the cost of mimicking can be increased 
to any arbitrary level without affecting the profit of the incumbent.  
Note that the incumbent’s scheme cannot be implemented with a standard forward 
contract,  as  the  separation  constraint  would  then  be  violated.  The  availability  of 
option  contracts  allows  the  incumbent  to  set  a  low  f   and  a  high  x  while  still 
keeping control of the probability of entry through the choice of s. 
Thus, even if no market participant can be certain that it is the incumbent that is 
taking a large speculative position, in equilibrium everybody infers that he is the 
only one with an interest in doing so. As a result, each time the incumbent manages 
to sell to the buyer, entry is restricted below social optimum. 
5  Conclusion 
We have shown in a very simple model that an incumbent is able extract rent from 
an  efficient  entrant  by  taking  a  speculative  position  in  the  derivatives  market,   22
inefficiently deterring entry. To do so, he will sell more option contracts than its 
underlying volume of spot market transactions. This speculative position will give 
him an incentive to behave more aggressively in the spot market, both in situations 
where entry occurs, and in situations where it does not.  
The incumbent is able to recoup the low prices it charges to the buyer by adjusting 
the price for which it sells the option and the number of contracts. Interestingly, the 
exclusionary  outcome  can  also  be  attained  under  perfect  information  by  using  a 
simple forward contract. 
When the buyer is risk-neutral, the contracting pair solves a problem that is akin to a 
standard monopsony problem, trading-off the likelihood of entry against the level of 
the post-entry price. When the buyer is risk-averse, the pair is led to allow for more 
entry, as a way to improve the terms of the risky lottery that the buyer faces as a 
result of uncertain entry. 
The  optimal  contract  is  such  that  the  incumbent  prices  below  costs  in  all 
circumstances. In a sense, through the use of financial instruments, the incumbent 
commits  to  predatory  pricing,  although  this  way  of  presenting  the  case  may  be 
misleading. Indeed, there is no profit sacrifice in the short-term: given his financial 
commitments, the incumbent does what is optimal for him in a static fashion. For this 
reason,  the  competition  abuse  we  identify  in  this  paper  might  not  be  caught  by 
current  case  law  about  predation,  which  requires  short-term  losses  recouped  by 
future gains. 
When  the  identities  of  the  parties  to  a  financial  contract  are  not  public  (but  the 
contract characteristics are observable), the incumbent and the buyer are still able 
inefficiently  to  deter  entry.  The  reason  is  that  nobody  but  the  incumbent  has  an 
incentive  to  bet  a  large  amount  of  money  on  low  prices.  Thus,  in  equilibrium, 
everybody rightly infers from the availability of such contracts that reduced entry 
will ensue. 
This paper thus raises the possibility that routine financial transactions may be used 
by incumbent firms to exclude efficient rivals. As far as we can judge, there is very 
little recognition of this concern and, indeed, competition authorities do not typically   23
monitor the financial positions of dominant firms. We argue that on certain markets, 
such as the electricity, gas, or gold markets, in which big producers and big buyers 
are both active on the spot market and the derivatives market, there might be reasons 
to start doing so. Warning signs of an operative exclusion scheme can be found in the 
fact that a dominant firm takes financial positions way in excess of its underlying 
production operations, that buyers are willing to pay a premium over the normal 
price of insurance and that spot prices increase upon entry. 
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